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Abstract—The efficient and reliable handling of numerous
communicating devices responsible for the monitoring and con-
trol of the distribution grid constitutes one of the key challenges
for the realization of the smart grid. Cellular technology relying
on LTE-based standards has been identified as a promising option
to support advanced distribution-grid operations with stringent
communication requirements. In this paper, a reliability analysis
of wide-area monitoring systems in cellular-enabled distribution
grids is presented. The LTE random access channel (RACH)
procedure enhanced with an access class barring (ACB) scheme
is modeled via a Markov chain taking into account a realistic
model of the varying traffic behavior of monitoring devices.
Based on the proposed analytical framework, we derive the
reliability expression which depends on various RACH and ACB
parameters and the monitoring traffic characteristics. With the
aid of extensive simulations, we validate the accuracy of our
analytical model. Finally, a performance evaluation in terms
of reliability is carried out under different network and traffic
configurations and several insights can be drawn for the reliable
support of monitoring traffic.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the emergence of distributed energy resources, the
distribution grid integrates more complex loads and decen-
tralized generation, resulting in a growing need for real-
time monitoring and control. One of the key components
for efficient distribution-grid operation refers to the underly-
ing communication technology selected to support wide-area
monitoring systems. These systems typically involve extensive
and reliable information exchange originated from monitoring
equipment installed along the distribution grid, e.g., Intelligent
Electronic Devices (IEDs).
Cellular technology relying on LTE-based standards has
been identified as a promising communication option to en-
hance the observability and controllability of the distribu-
tion grid [1]. However, cellular technology was not initially
designed to handle efficiently the near-simultaneous access
of numerous IEDs. In particular, the LTE Random Access
CHannel (RACH) procedure, where devices request transmis-
sion resources or re-establish a connection to the eNodeB,
suffers from congestion as the traffic load and the number
of access requests increase [2]. Besides the need for network
connectivity for a sheer scale of IEDs, the monitoring traffic
characteristics, e.g., sporadic and event-driven messages for
real-time situational awareness, are fundamentally different
from traditional human-type communication.
In this context, the 3GPP has already raised the need to
revisit the radio access design of future cellular networks in
order to provide reliable connectivity for massive machine-
type communication [3]. Among the various methods proposed
to improve the contention-based RACH operation, the 3GPP
adopts the Access Class Barring (ACB) scheme as an addi-
tional overload control mechanism to prevent access failures
[4]. In case of network overload, the eNodeB broadcasts to the
different traffic classes a set of parameters related to ACB,
as part of the system information; this includes a barring
rate factor and a barring timer for backoff. Each device then
performs a Bernoulli trial to determine whether it is barred or
not, based on the barring rate value. The ACB scheme and its
subsequent amendments, e.g., dynamic ACB [5] for adaptive
barring and extended ACB [6] for delay prioritization, rely on
backoff periods to disperse the simultaneous access attempts
over time and alleviate the congestion.
Several simulation-based studies [5], [7]–[9] and analytical
works [10], [11] investigate the performance of the LTE RACH
procedure for smart grid traffic. The majority of feasibility
studies aim at determining the optimal values of the barring
[5], [7], backoff [8] or paging [9] RACH parameters through
system-level simulations. In an effort to proactively estimate
the anticipated smart grid traffic load (alarm reports, periodic
measurements), the authors in [10] propose a mechanism that
determines the channel access opportunities for smart grid
entities. A similar approach is followed in [6], where the
authors perform an analysis of the extended ACB scheme
based on difference equations in order to estimate the RACH
performance. In both works [6], [10], the 3GPP-based models
for uncoordinated and synchronous traffic are adopted. Instead,
here we assume a reactive approach in dealing with massive
monitoring traffic arrivals, where the network loading state is
considered to be continuously monitored by the eNodeB with
the overload-detection mechanism proposed in [12]. The au-
thors in [11] analytically assess the signaling limitations of the
standard RACH procedure for smart grid monitoring traffic.
However, no ACB scheme is considered in the analysis and the
traffic modeling approach relies on a simple Poisson process
for the aggregated data with periodic reporting frequency.
Contribution: The contribution of this paper is threefold.
First, by leveraging tools from Markov chain theory, we intro-
duce a tractable analytical model of the contention-based LTE
random access mechanism enhanced with an ACB scheme for
the connection establishment of a high number of IEDs. In
addition, we propose a Markov Modulated Poisson Process
(MMPP) traffic model to capture the varying traffic behavior of
monitoring IEDs in power distribution grids. Unlike previous
related works, our traffic modeling approach accounts for the
frequency and duration of a burst traffic generation. Finally,
we derive the analytical expression of the achieved reliability
based on the developed analytical framework. The accuracy
of the proposed analysis is validated with the aid of extensive
simulations in ns-3 discrete-event simulator. A performance
assessment reveals the impact of the monitoring traffic charac-
teristics and RACH/ACB parameters in the achieved reliability.
Organization: The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Section II provides an overview of the channel access proce-
dure followed in LTE standards. In Section III, an analytical
model of the contention-based LTE random access mechanism
enhanced with an ACB scheme is introduced and a traffic
model for monitoring IEDs in the distribution grid is proposed.
In Section IV, the analytical expression of reliability is derived
as a function of the monitoring traffic characteristics and
RACH/ACB parameters. Our analysis is validated by means of
extensive simulations in Section V along with a performance
assessment in terms of reliability under different network and
traffic configurations. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE RANDOM ACCESS MECHANISM IN
LTE NETWORKS
In LTE networks, devices use the physical RACH to perform
initial association with the eNodeB, re-establish a failed radio
link or request transmission resources when no dedicated
scheduling-request resources have been assigned [2]. The
RACH is formed by a periodic reservation of uplink time-
frequency resource blocks, the random access slots, for the
transmission of access requests. The eNodeB broadcasts the
random access slot periodicity which may vary from once in
every subframe (1ms) to once every two frames (20ms), based
on the RACH configuration index1 [2]. In this study, we assume
that a random access slot is available in every subframe to
counteract for the high number of requesting IEDs.
The random access procedure in LTE can be either
contention-free or contention-based. In the contention-free
mode, the eNodeB allocates dedicated access resources for
requests that require high probability of success, e.g., handover
and synchronization. This study focuses on the contention-
based random access operation enhanced with an ACB
scheme. As illustrated in Fig. 1, each IED draws a uniform
random number between 0 and 1 when initiating a connection
establishment and compares it with the current barring rate1;
if the number is lower than the barring rate, the IED is able
to attempt an access. Otherwise, the access is barred and
the IED performs a random backoff time uniformly selected
over a period determined by the barring timer value1, before
performing a new trial.
1The values of the RACH configuration index and the ACB parameters are
broadcast by the eNodeB as part of the system information [13].
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Fig. 1. Contention-based LTE random access procedure enhanced with an
ACB scheme [2].
The contention-based random access mechanism involves a
four-way message exchange with the eNodeB. In particular,
the following consecutive messages are sent:
1) RACH preamble. According to the 3GPP physical layer
specifications, a preamble constitutes a pseudo-random digital
signature that a device randomly selects to transmit over the
first available random access slot of the RACH. A subset of
preambles is often reserved for contention-free access and
their availability for contention-based access is periodically
broadcast by the eNodeB.
2) Random Access Response (RAR). In turn, the eNodeB
processes the preambles received on a specific random access
slot and provides feedback in a RAR message to all the
IEDs with preamble transmission on this random access slot.
The RAR message includes an identifier of each successfully
decoded preamble, timing information for synchronization, a
temporary device identifier and an uplink resource grant for
devices to transmit a connection request, the next message of
the handshake. In case that an IED receives a RAR without
the identifier of the preamble it used, it is signaled, via a
backoff indicator attached to the RAR, to wait for a random
time uniformly selected over a period, until the next preamble
transmission attempt. If more than one IEDs attempted access
with the same preamble over the same random access slot,
they will receive the same RAR message and their contention
will be resolved in the next step.
3) Connection Request. Upon receiving the resource grant
in RAR, the IED transmits a connection request message
to the eNodeB, conveying -among other information- the
device identifier and the establishment cause, e.g., scheduling
resources request. In case of preamble collision in the previous
step, more than one IEDs will transmit in the same uplink
resource; the eNodeB then identifies the collision and will not
reply with an acknowledgment.
4) Contention Resolution: In response to a successfully re-
ceived connection request message, the eNodeB transmits a
contention resolution message as an acknowledgment. The
completion of this step renders the random access attempt
successful. Otherwise, if the message is not received by an IED
within a predefined contention resolution timer, the random
access procedure is considered unsuccessful and the IED needs
to restart a new random access attempt until the limit for its
allowed preamble transmissions is reached.
III. ANALYTICAL MODEL
In this section, we propose an analytical model of the
contention-based LTE random access mechanism enhanced
with an ACB scheme for the efficient handling of a high
number of monitoring IEDs. We consider a cellular-enabled
power distribution grid where N IEDs reside within a single-
cell coverage area and contend in the RACH for network
access. In the following, we study the behavior of a single
IED by using a two-dimensional Markov chain model.
A. Markov Chain Model
Let α(t) and β(t) be the stochastic processes corresponding
to the random access attempt and the backoff stage at time t,
respectively, experienced by an IED contending for channel
access. We assume that the stationary probability τ that an
IED attempts a random access is constant across all random
access slots and independent of other IEDs. This is considered
as a realistic assumption in the case of a high number of
IEDs present in the system. Then, (α(t), β(t)) constitutes a
two-dimensional Markov chain. Let also M be the maximum
allowed number of random access attempts, rth the access class
barring rate and B, W , the backoff window sizes for barring
and random access, respectively. As indicated in Fig. 2, for
the finite state space of the Markov chain, the following hold:
• The off state represents the state when the idle IED is
expecting a new packet arrival based on the considered
unsaturated traffic model. Let pon be the traffic generation
probability related with the specific monitoring applica-
tion.
• The states (Q0, . . . , QB−1) model the barring states of
the ACB scheme. The probability of entering/returning to
a barring state equals to the probability q0 of the drawn
random number being higher than the barring rate rth
of the ACB scheme, normalized by the barring backoff
window size, B.
• The states (i, 0), i ∈ [1,M ], correspond to the random
access states when the IED attempts a preamble trans-
mission. In this work, we assume that an unsuccessful
random access attempt may occur only due to preamble
collision; thus, the probability of moving from states
(i− 1, 0) to (i, j), for i ∈ [2,M ], equals to the preamble
collision probability, pc, normalized by the random access
backoff window size, W . We leave the consideration of
a wireless channel error on an unsuccessful preamble
transmission and the capture effect of collided connection
request messages for future work.
• The states from (i, 1) to (i,W − 1), i ∈ [2,M ], represent
the backoff states due to an unsuccessful (i− 1, 0) access
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Fig. 2. Markov chain model for the contention-based LTE random access
mechanism enhanced with an ACB scheme.
attempt. The IED decreases its backoff index by 1 every
1ms and transits from (i, j) to state (i, j − 1). A random
backoff is also considered upon the initialization of the
RACH procedure, i.e., the states (1, j), j ∈ [1,W − 1].
• The success and fail states model the successful and failed
random access attempt, respectively. A failed random
access attempt occurs when the limit of M allowed
preamble transmissions is reached without successful
attempt.
• The IED always returns to the off state after the success
or fail states.
The state transition probabilities associated with the Markov
chain of Fig. 2 can be calculated as follows:
Pr (i, j|i, j + 1) = 1, 1 ≤ i ≤M, 0 ≤ j ≤W − 2, (1a)
Pr (i, j|i− 1, 0) =
pc
W
, 2 ≤ i ≤M, 0 ≤ j ≤W − 1, (1b)
Pr (Qc|Qc+1) = 1, 0 ≤ c ≤ B − 2, (1c)
Pr (Qc|off) =
q0
B
pon, 0 ≤ c ≤ B − 1, (1d)
Pr (Qc|Q0) =
q0
B
, 0 ≤ c ≤ B − 1, (1e)
Pr (1, j|off) =
(1− q0)
W
pon, 0 ≤ j ≤W − 1, (1f)
Pr (1, j|Q0) =
(1− q0)
W
, 0 ≤ j ≤W − 1, (1g)
Pr (fail|M, 0) = pc, (1h)
Pr (success|i, 0) = 1− pc, 1 ≤ i ≤M, (1i)
Pr (off|success) = Pr (off|fail) = 1. (1j)
Eq. (1a) shows the decrease of the backoff index, which
occurs with probability 1. Eq. (1b) represents the probability
of collision in the random access and of selecting a backoff
state uniformly in the subsequent random access attempt.
Eq. (1c) shows the transition between the barring states which
occurs with probability 1. Eqs. (1d) and (1e) capture the
probabilities of entering and returning to the barring states
from the off and Q0 states, respectively. Eqs. (1f) and (1g)
represent the probabilities of moving to state (1, j) from the
off and Q0 states, respectively. Eqs. (1h) and (1i) capture
the probabilities of a failed and successful random access,
respectively. Eq. (1j) implies that the IED always returns to
off state after a successful or failed random access.
Let (boff, bQc , bi,j , bsuccess, bfail), c ∈ [0, B − 1], i ∈ [1,M ],
j ∈ [0,W − 1], be the stationary distribution of the Markov
chain, where bi,j = limt→∞ Pr (α(t) = i, β(t) = j). From
Eqs. (1a)–(1j), we derive the closed form expression for such
distribution chain. In particular, for the stationary probabilities
of the barring states we have
bQc =
q0
B
ponboff + bQc+1 +
q0
B
bQ0 , 0 ≤ c ≤ B − 2, (2)
bQB−1 =
q0
B
ponboff +
q0
B
bQ0 . (3)
For the random access and backoff states we obtain
b1,j = b1,j+1 +
(1− q0)
W
(bQ0 + ponboff) , 0 ≤ j ≤W − 2,
(4)
b1,W−1 =
(1− q0)
W
(bQ0 + ponboff) , (5)
bi,j = bi,j+1 + bi−1,0
pc
W
, 2 ≤ i ≤M, 0 ≤ j ≤W − 2, (6)
bi,W−1 = bi−1,0
pc
W
, 2 ≤ i ≤M. (7)
Finally, for the success and fail states we have
bsuccess =
M∑
i=1
((1− pc)bi,0) , (8)
bfail = pcbM,0. (9)
Owing to the chain regularities and Eqs. (2)–(9), the state
expressions can be rewritten as
bQ0 =
q0
1− q0
ponboff, (10a)
bQc = (B − c)
q0
B
(ponboff + bQ0) , 1 ≤ c ≤ B − 1, (10b)
b1,j =
W − j
W
b1,0, 1 ≤ j ≤W − 1, (10c)
b1,0 = (1− q0) (bQ0 + ponboff) , (10d)
bi,j =
W − j
W
bi,0, 2 ≤ i ≤M, 1 ≤ j ≤W − 1, (10e)
bi,0 = bi−1,0pc = b1,0p
i−1
c , 2 ≤ i ≤M, (10f)
bsuccess = ponboff
(
1− pMc
)
, (10g)
bfail = p
M
c ponboff. (10h)
Note that from Eqs. (10a)–(10h), all states can be expressed
as a function of boff. By applying the expressions for the state
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Fig. 4. The MMPP model for each IED traffic generation. A two-state Markov
chain describes the transition between the regular and alarm operation of a
monitoring IED.
stationary probabilities in the normalization condition for the
Markov chain,
1 = boff +
B−1∑
c=0
bQc +
M∑
i=1
W−1∑
j=0
bi,j + bsuccess + bfail, (11)
we obtain the expression for the stationary probability boff,
boff =
1
1 + pon
(
1 + B+1
2
q0
1−q0
+ W+1
2
pMc −1
pc−1
) , (12)
as a function of the traffic generation probability, pon, the
preamble collision probability, pc, and the probability of barred
access, q0.
In the following, we derive the expression for the traffic
generation probability, pon, based on a realistic traffic model
selected to match the behavior of a monitoring IED.
B. Traffic Model
The IEDs reside within the substation local area networks
and can be seen as controllers that get their input from voltage
and current transformers/sensors and provide their output
(commands, status data), e.g., to circuit breakers, offering
monitoring functionalities in the distribution grid. Under stable
operating conditions, each IED periodically reports its appli-
cation states via identical messages as a heart-beat function;
however, once an event (e.g., power failure) occurs or a status
change is detected, an IED transits from regular to alarm
state while the retransmission period of messages is shortened
(burst traffic). Fig. 3 shows the traffic pattern of IEC 61850-8-1
Generic Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) messages
that can be used for fast horizontal communication among
IEDs to enable fast transmission of substation events [12].
In an effort to capture this varying behavior of IED traf-
fic, we may model each IED traffic generation using the
Markov Modulated Poisson Process (MMPP) framework [14].
In particular, each IED is represented by a two-state Markov
chain and a corresponding Poisson process. As illustrated in
Fig. 4, the first state models the regular IED operation as a
Poisson process with rate λ1 and the second state represents
the alarm IED operation where the generation of a traffic burst
is modeled as a Poisson process with a corresponding rate
λ2 > λ1. Let P be the state transition matrix that incorporates
the transition probabilities between the states of the Markov
chain of Fig. 4. Then,
P =
[
1− γ γ
δ 1− δ
]
, (13)
where γ is associated with the frequency of a burst occurrence
and δ is related with the duration of each burst. Let also pi =
{pi1, pi2} be the stationary distribution vector. Then, from the
steady-state equations pi = piP and pi1 + pi2 = 1, we derive
the stationary distribution pi of the chain as
pi =
{
δ
γ + δ
,
γ
γ + δ
}
. (14)
The traffic generation probability for an IED, pon, is defined
as the probability to have at least one packet arrival within a
subframe of length 1ms, and is calculated as
pon = 1− e
−λg , (15)
where the λg =
∑2
i=1 λipii denotes the overall rate of the
MMPP [14]. In the following section, we derive an analytical
expression for the reliability based on the developed Markov
chain model.
IV. RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
We define reliability, R, as the probability of an IED
successfully completing a random access attempt when there
are M allowed preamble transmission attempts. Based on
the proposed Markov chain model developed in the previous
section, we derive the expression of reliability as
R =
bsuccess
bsuccess + bfail
, (16)
and by using the expressions for bsuccess and bfail from (10g)
and (10h) respectively, we get
R = 1− pMc . (17)
For the calculation of R we first need to determine the
probability τ that an IED attempts for access. Assuming that
the preamble transmission holds for 1ms, τ is determined as
τ =
∑M
i=1 bi,0
T
, (18)
where T denotes the expected state holding time for all states
and is equal to
T = boff
(
1
λg
)
+
B−1∑
c=0
bQc +
M∑
i=1
W−1∑
j=1
bi,j
+
M∑
i=1
bi,0 (pcT1 + (1− pc)T2) + bsuccessTs + bfailTf .
(19)
In Eq. (19), the expected holding time for the off state
is 1/λg and the expected holding time of each barring and
TABLE I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Parameter Value
Preambles for contention-based access K 54
Number of monitoring IEDs N 1000
RACH configuration index 14
Barring/access backoff window sizes B, W (in ms) 20
Barring rate rth 0.5
Preamble duration (in ms) 1
Max. allowed preamble transmission attempts M 10
RAR window size (in ms) 5
Contention resolution timer (in ms) 24
Master information block periodicity (in ms) 40
Arrival rates λ1, λ2 (in attempts/ms) {0.002, 0.5}
Time durations T1, T2, Ts, Tf (in ms) {32, 16, 20, 1}
Traffic model transition probabilities γ, δ {0.5, 0.3}
backoff state is 1 ms. The expected holding time of a random
access state (i, 0) is obtained as pcT1 + (1 − pc)T2, where
T1 and T2 correspond to the elapsed times from the first
access attempt until the end of the contention resolution timer
in case of failure, and until the reception of the contention
resolution message in case of success, respectively. Finally,
Tf denotes the expected time duration of the fail state and Ts
corresponds to the average holding time of the success state
which depends on the adopted resource-scheduling policy of
the service request and the message payload of the monitoring
IED.
Given that an IED transmits, the preamble collision proba-
bility, pc, from the perspective of the IED, is defined as the
probability that at least one of the s IEDs attempting random
channel access (from the remaining N − 1 IEDs) selects the
same preamble. Let K be the number of available preambles
for contention-based random access, then pc is given by the
conditional probability
pc =
N−1∑
s=1
(
N − 1
s
)
τ s(1− τ)N−1−s
(
1−
(
1−
1
K
)s)
,
(20)
as a function of τ . It can thus be observed from (12)–(15)
and (18)–(20), that the reliability expression in (17) depends
on the monitoring traffic characteristics and the RACH/ACB
parameters. Note that for known pon and q0, the expressions of
the probability τ of attempting a random access in (18) and the
preamble collision probability pc in (20) form a system of non-
linear equations that can be solved via an iterative numerical
method. Therefore, by plugging the obtained value of pc in
(17), the value of R can be calculated.
V. MODEL VALIDATION AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we validate and evaluate our proposed
analytical framework in terms of reliability with the aid of
extensive simulations with ns-3 discrete-event simulator. The
simulation setup relies on the RACH implementation initially
developed in [2] and follows the 3GPP specifications [3].
The existing traffic generation and ACB modules have been
properly modified/extended when necessary and the MMPP
parameters are selected to closely match the traffic behavior
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Fig. 5. Reliability achieved per IED for different number of monitoring IEDs
present in the system when RACH procedure is enhanced with the ACB
scheme and when ACB is not applied.
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Fig. 6. Reliability achieved per IED as a function of the traffic characteristics
γ, δ of the monitoring IEDs when ACB scheme is applied in the RACH.
of IEC 61850 GOOSE messages conveying synchrophasor
information [15]. A performance evaluation is conducted and
we investigate the effect of the traffic characteristics, the
barring rate and the number of available preambles on the
achieved reliability. In Figs. 5–8, we illustrate both the analyt-
ical results (lines) obtained from the reliability expression in
Eq. (17) and the simulation results (marks) of the RACH/ACB
implementation. It can be observed that the analytical results
accurately match the simulation results which validates our
proposed analytical model. Table I summarizes the basic
parameters used in our simulations.
Fig. 5 illustrates the reliability achieved per IED for a
different number of monitoring IEDs present in the system,
when the ACB scheme is activated (q0 6= 0) and when ACB
barring is not applied in the RACH procedure (q0 = 0). It
can be seen that reliability levels decrease as the number
of IEDs increases due to the heavier contention; however, a
RACH procedure enhanced with the ACB scheme achieves
higher reliability even in high traffic regime since IED channel
access attempts are dispersed over time. Thus, IEDs remain in
contention for less time and preamble collision probability is
reduced.
Fig. 6 shows the reliability achieved per IED as a function
of the traffic characteristics γ, δ of the monitoring IEDs.
As defined in Fig. 4, γ is associated with the frequency of
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Fig. 7. Reliability achieved per IED as a function of the barring rate rth of
the ACB scheme for a different number of IEDs.
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Fig. 8. Reliability achieved per IED as a function of the number of available
preambles K for contention-based access when RACH procedure is enhanced
with the ACB scheme and when ACB is not applied.
occurrence of a burst and δ is related with the burst time
duration. It can be seen that as the frequency of a burst
increases, or equivalently γ increases, the reliability decreases
due to the higher attempt rate in the alarm state which leads to
a surge of channel access attempts. In addition, as the length of
each burst increases, or equivalently δ decreases, the reliability
decreases since the IEDs remain longer in the alarm state.
Fig. 7 depicts the reliability achieved per IED as a function
of the barring rate rth of the ACB scheme for a different
number of IEDs. In particular, the reliability increases with
a decreasing access barring rate; when the barring rate is set
to a more restrictive value, it is more likely that new IED
access requests are spread in time-subsequent attempts due
to the barring backoff B. Although decreasing the barring
rate may ease the congestion and improve access success
probability, the average access delay for IED monitoring traffic
is increased, especially for high number of access attempts.
We aim to study and quantify the delay-reliability tradeoff for
specific monitoring application requirements in future work.
Fig. 8 illustrates the reliability achieved per IED as a func-
tion of the number of available preambles K for contention-
based access of the monitoring IEDs. It can be seen that
reliability levels decrease as the number of available preambles
decreases due to the lack of adequate access opportunities;
however, a RACH procedure enhanced with the ACB scheme
achieves higher reliability compared to the performance of the
pure RACH procedure. This superior performance is important
in use cases where the available preambles for contention-
based access are shared with the conventional LTE users
in public cellular networks. An interesting tradeoff analysis
would determine the optimal number of dedicated preambles
for the competing traffic classes, given specific quality of
service requirements.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose an analytical framework for
reliability analysis of massive monitoring traffic in cellular-
enabled distribution grids. Based on the Markov chain theory,
we model the contention-based LTE random access operation
enhanced with an ACB scheme for the connection estab-
lishment of a high number of IEDs. We further propose
an MMPP traffic model to capture the IED transition from
regular to alarm state. Based on the conducted analysis, we
derive the reliability expression which depends on various
RACH and ACB parameters and the monitoring IED traffic
characteristics. Our analytical framework is validated through
extensive simulations and the impact on the achieved reliability
is evaluated under different network and traffic configurations.
Since the contention-based random access procedure in recent
3GPP advancements tailored for the Internet of Things (IoT),
i.e., LTE-M and NarrowBand IoT2 (NB-IoT), follows its
counterpart in LTE, the rationale of the proposed analytical
model can also be applicable for the performance analysis of
smart grid monitoring traffic using cellular IoT technologies.
Future investigations include the study of latency-reliability
trade-offs based on specific monitoring application require-
ments and the quantification of the impact on background
human-type traffic when present in a shared cellular system.
We also aim to model the traffic dynamics of correlated
transitions from regular to alarm state for different IEDs as
a result of a widespread power grid cascading failure.
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